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Abstract  
The central theme of this study was to examine the implication of governance for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is characterized by both intra-state and 
inter-state conflicts. The causes of such conflicts are the function of internally driven, externally induced and 
geo-politically motivated. This study gives emphasis the link between the mode of governance in the states of 
the Horn of Africa and conflicts. In order to understand the interplay between governance and conflict in the 
study area, the study employed descriptive qualitative approach and mainly based on secondary sources. On the 
basis of this methodology, the finding of the study revealed that conflicts in the Horn of Africa have a direct 
linkage with the mode of governance lied in the exercise of the public authority. 
Keywords: Governance, Conflict Prevention, Horn of Africa. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Horn of Africa
1
 characterized, among others, and has come to be identified with conflict inundation of both 
intra-cine and inter-state sorts. As to one author
2
, this region of the African continent is the “arc of conflict” next 
to the Middle East with the complexity of issues involved and the behavioral metamorphosis of the conflicting 
actors. During the Cold War, the onus of ideological confrontation was borne in the form of warfare in Sudan, 
Ethiopia against the secessionist and with Somalia’s irredentist aspiration, Djibouti until 1977 with Somalia and 
so on.  The common pattern of alignment in these conflicts was the belligerents belong to dichotomously either 
of the two blocks.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the hope was that it would be easier to deal effectively with 
conflicts of a varying nature and scope. Kidane recites the then expectation in dealing with the core or 
recognized as the inherent cause/s of the conflict in the region, “Twenty years ago, it was commonplace to hear 
experts talk about containing conflicts in the Horn of Africa,  preventing their further escalation, and even, in the 
longer run, addressing  their root causes.” 
3
  Conflicts are still pervasive either in the protracted manner or in the 
form of protests.  The Darfur conflict, the Sudan-South Sudan tense relations, Somalia, Ethio-Eritrea, Eritrea 
against Djibouti and Sudan, Somalia militants against Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda are some of the well voiced 
conflicts apart from those repressive originated conflicts in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and to some extent in 
Somalia.  The causes of such conflicts are the function of internally driven, externally induced and geo-
politically motivated.  The nature of governance in the states reflects the inner fine core of the political system 
they peruse and the most important factor in dealing with conflicts.  Even for those conflicts having global realm 
governments have the power to contain their ramification on the people since they have resources and seemingly 
unlimited power though its legitimacy could be contested.  Poverty, illiteracy, society and a narrowed political 
space render absolute like government. 
The purpose of the study, therefore,   is to expatiate the link between the mode of governance in the 
states of the Horn of Africa and conflicts.  What form of governance is best suited to bulwark conflicts is the 
central question that has to be addressed before proceeding to the case at hand.  
 
2. Conflict and Governance: Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Conflict 
The term conflict is one of those terminologies in the study of social phenomenon and its conception is proffered 
against normative referents imbued with circumstances that indicate the contrary of what conflict holds. Among 
these referents, the term peace is widely applied.  This supplies the conception of conflict to be made out in 
                                                          
1  Kidane puts that The Horn of Africa proper is a geographical concept referring to the countries of Djibouti,  
   Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia.  The Greater Horn, on the other hand, is largely a political  concept that incorporates Kenya, 
Sudan, and Uganda into the Horn region and encompasses  all the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD). Kidane , Mengisteab ‘Critical factors in the Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts,’  Discussion  Paper 67. 
NorDisKa  AFriKainsTiTuTeT, uPPsaLa , 2011, (UK: Lightening Source.) 
2 Bereket, Habteselassie (1980) Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa. (London and New York: Monthly Review). 
3  Sharamo, Roba and (ed.) ‘Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ Institute for Security Studies,’ 
Monograph 178, April 2011, xii-xv.  
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formulating a negative definition of conflict that is the opposite of peace.  Hence, the lack of peace means 
perfunctorily the presence of conflict.
1
  It is due to this reason most discussions in the area conflict management 
and resolution are predicated on peace building strategies and platforms as the deleterious to the conflictive 
interactions.      
Some authors, however, approach what constitute conflict is by its own inner logic rather than by 
making a dual comparison with peace for the fact that peace itself needs its own definition. It seems for that 
purpose Johan Galtung
2
 defines in attributive manner that conflict means the existence of contradiction of goal, 
interests and values.  This definition suggests the clash of interests and claims engenders the state of conflict 
where one stands on the road of the others structurally in a systemic sort or direct violence that involves physical 
encounter. The possibility of arriving at mutually acceptable results for the disputants seems non-existent in the 
actual reality because their goals and interests are bound to be incompatible.
3
     
With regard determining who involves in conflict, its omnipresence is proved true that from an 
individual to international organizations engages in conflict since they pursuit a certain set of interests and 
preferences. Esman underlines, “conflict may occur at any level of social interaction form localities and 
neighborhood to the central government.”
4
  In terms of classifying such occurrences of conflicts, Wallenstein
5
  
comes up with three categories of conflicts, namely: interstate, intrastate, and state formation conflicts. As the 
next discussion points out, the last conflict is characterized by a societal conflict where the state is not the major 
actor of the conflict as opposed to the first two. In the intrastate one, the state is in conflict with domestic forces 
who renounce the very integrity of the state or the legitimacy of the government in power. An inter-state is the 
widest in its scope of conflict in which two or more states are the participant.  Similarly
6
, others classify conflicts 
with a varying nomenclature of civil war and inter-communal for the intrastate and state formation conflicts, 
respectively.   
 
2.1.1 Internecine Conflict and its Dynamics 
In dealing with the causes of inter-communal and intra-state conflicts, the relevant theories are the theory of 
relative deprivation and horizontal inequality.
 7
 The former is predicated on the feasibility of making comparison 
as to the distribution of wealth and assets between two ethnic groups. It is for the simple reason that comparing 
two ethnic groups is easier than three or above. This even leads Ostby
8
 to make a contradictory relation between 
the growths of GDP and conflicts for the reason that the more GDP grows the more likely ethnic conflicts to 
erupt due to the inherent unevenness of growth. 
The theory of horizontal inequality is wider than the theory of relative deprivation in its explanatory 
capacity.  The conventional inequality between poor and rich could not be the triggering factor for ethnic conflict 
unless coincided with the ethnic identities of the poor and the rich themselves that function in a systemic manner 
based on the patron-client relation between elites and their co-ethnic, religious or linguistic groups.
9
. Hence, 
Inequalities that coincide with social cleavages may enhance both grievances, group cohesion among the 
relatively deprived, and which facilitates mobilization for conflict for the very reason that violence are group 
conflicts – not confrontations between individuals fighting randomly each other.
10
   This is further exacerbated 
                                                          
1 Horn of Africa Steering Committee. “Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: What Role for the United States?”  Wilson 
Center for International Scholarships, 2011.  
2 Galtung, Johan (1958). Theories of conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations and Formations. (Colombia: Colombia 
University Press), p. 20-’21. Accessed at 
www.google.com.et/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=AFQjCNEUexS3w3jeksuie7LUtf0SPrBji.com 
3 See Ibid, First Chapter, “Definition of Conflict”.  
4 Esman, Milton J. (2004) An Introduction to Ethnic conflict (Cambridge: Polity press), P.3  
5 King, Marye (ed.) (2005) A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies, University for Peace: Africa 
Programme.  
6 Smith, Dan (2004) Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 
Handbook. Available at: http://www.berghof-handbook.net (Accessed: 20 October 2013) and Rothman, Jay and Olson, Marie 
L. (2001) `From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict.’ Journal of Peace Research 
Resolution, 38(3), p. 289–305. 
7 See Ostby, Gudrun ‘ Polarization, Horizontal Inequality and Violent Civil conflict ‘, Journal of Peace Research, 2008, 
Vol.45,  No.2, 143-162.  
8 IBID, P.156. 
9 Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative 
Perspective. (Cambridge &New York: Cambridge University Press), 
10 Duclos, Jean-Yves; Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray ‘Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation’, Econometrica 72(6): 
1737–1772, 2004, See Gurr, Ted Robert, 2000. Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press); Murshed, S. Mansoob & Scott Gates, 2005. ‘Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and 
the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, Review of Development Economics 9(1): 121–134; and Stewart, Frances, 2000. ‘Crisis 
Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’,  Oxford Development Studies 28(3): 245–262 all mentioned in Ostby, Gudrun 
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by the competition over natural resources to support the subsistence livelihood especially in poorer areas of 
Africa and Asia, adding territorial claims and identity based mobilization for securing space in the political 
setting of the state.
1
  
Finally, to make things clearer, the dynamics of internecine conflict has a chain of events that ends up 
socially destructive, politically unacceptable and morally indefensible.  Begins from opposing or protesting the 
other side then attacking the main target group and, terminally, the warring inter-communal blocks. 
2
  Hector 
uses two indicators of internecine conflict in the form of anti-regime activities: protests and rebellion.
3
 Protest 
includes lesser forms of anti-regime activities such as expression of verbal opposition, symbolic rebellion and 
demonstrations and escalating to rebellious activities of political banditry, terrorist campaigns, guerrilla activity 
and protracted civil war. Besides, of this, Brancati also uses two variables to measure the intensity of anti-regime 
rebellion and inter-communal conflict.
4
  He further divides anti-regime rebellion and inter-communal conflicts in 
to seven and six levels respectively. From 1 to 6/7 the intensity of the conflict is becoming deeper and wider in 
scope to threaten the state’s integrity. 
 
2.2.  Governance- Conflict Interplay 
Governance refers to the totality of procedural, practical, institutional and citizenry rights in the exercise of 
political, economic, administrative and legal authority in the management of a country’s public affairs at all 
levels.
 5
  From the viewpoint of conflict prevention, management and resolution, the implication of governances 
calls for as to how the public authority is helpful to do so.  This is because governance is not an antidote to any 
kind of conflict wherever it may happen; rather it could engender new conflict formation or allow deteriorating 
the already temporal one.  It follows that the impact that governance could have  on conflict is the function of its 
modus operandi  and  viability  with respect to the  root of  the existing conflicts. 
The nature of conflicts determines the required governance set-up.  Structural conflicts require the 
governance system to face with issues of uppermost significance in the society since conflicts arises there are the 
most damaging and difficult to reverse.  Direct conflicts are more amenable to administrative decisions or 
measures than structural conflicts.  For example, the lack of equality and equity is one of the foundation of 
structural conflicts
6
  than physical violence among individuals which is  less challenging for the state machinery.  
So, what system of governance prevents or reduces both forms of conflicts? When a country adopts a 
democratic mode of managing its public affairs that is referred to as good governance. On the other hand, 
undemocratic management of public affairs is what many people usually equate with bad or poor governance.
7 
 
Given its commitment to openness, fairness, equal opportunity and fair play, democratic governance is the best 
means of conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
8 
 Thus, at this juncture, the main point is that of the 
mode of governance with democratic essences has the capacity in offsetting and addressing conflicts of different 
nature.  These essences could be summarized in to thee in terms of conflict negation: constitutionalism, social 
integration, decentralization and local empowerment, and socio-economic developments. 
 
I. Constitutionalism  
Constitutionalism refers to the system of governance that operates in the context of legally prescribed 
arrangements.  The exercise of political power has to be casted in line with those constitutional principles for 
which even the public at large expected to duly observe.  Theoretically, such wide-covering principles transpire 
the democratic expression of the will of the people and that is why the notion of constitutional supremacy has a 
direct relation with democracy. That is why it seems Micheal and Walle  challenge the attitude that 
constitutionalism is less applicable in the African context as they put, “the effort of African citizens to hold their 
leaders accountable  for providing for the common good are, at heart, a quest for democracy.”
9
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
‘ Polarization, Horizontal Inequality and Violent Civil conflict ‘, Journal of Peace Research, 2008, Vol.45,  No.2, 143-162, 
p.144. cited in Ostby, Gudrun ‘ Polarization, Horizontal Inequality and Violent Civil conflict ‘, Journal of Peace Research, 
2008, Vol.45,  No.2, 143-162. P.156. 
1 Horowitz, Donald (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 
2 Hector, Michael (2000) Containing Nationalism. (Oxford: Oxford university Press). 
3 Ibid, p.146 
4 Brancati, Daw (2006)’ Decentralization: fueling or Dampening the Flame of Ethnic conflict and secession? International 
organisation. P. 665  
5  UNDP, Report on the Human Development of Kenya, 1994 cited in Mwagiru, Makumi (ed.) (2004) African Regional 
Security in the Age of Globalization. (Nairobi:  Heinrich Böll Foundation). p.67. 
6 Coleman, Peter T (ed.) ‘Conflict, Interdependence and Justice: The Intellectual legacy of Morton Deutsch,’ in  Daniel J. 
Christie  (ed.) Peace Psychology Book Series (New York: Springer), 2011. 
7 Mwagiru, Makumi (ed.) (2004) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization. (Nairobi:  Heinrich Böll Foundation). 
p.68.  
8 Ibid, p. 7. 
9  Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative 
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Moreover, constitutionalism strengthens democracy by keeping the discretion of government with in legal 
circumscription.  At this point Kassahun
1
  illuminates two basic notions where constitutionalism centered on:  
the limitation of the state versus society by way of respect for a set of human rights covering civic, political and 
economic liberties; and the implementation of separation of powers distributed between the organs of the state 
and the human actors in which authority is vested. The curbing of the monopoly of power in the hands of a few 
personalities could compromise the constitutional liberties and rights of citizens, which, in turn, engenders 
conflicts.  The special relevance of the security sector to the rights implied in the possibility of abuse of power 
unless challenged before the court of laws that run under the principle of independent judiciary. Thus, 
constitutionalism as a basic principle of democratic governance requires the upholding of constitutional right of 
individuals or groups through a heightened sensitization of constitutional provisions in the interaction of the 
public with the government.  
It is a truism that implementation rests not on the beauty of the constitutions written but on the 
commitment to give effect to the letter and spirit of the constitutions.
2
  The need to exercise political and other 
powers in line with it is indispensable for fostering the value of having a constitution in terms of conflict 
management, most importantly in a post-conflicts state where the constitution serves as a peace-making tool.  
Which means, the armed forces, the police and the judiciary must be restructured to play effective roles in 
conflict management?  The armed forces should be restricted to national defense and security issues, and not be 




II. Societal Integration  
The second principle of governance that has a far-reaching impact on the prevention of conflicts is the necessity 
of   reducing inter-societal cleavages through nation building efforts.  Nation building refers to the process of 
expanding and establishing state authority over an entire territory,
4
  whose inhabitants are increasingly being 
integrated into an identity higher than those of their respective ethnic and regional identities may give. 
Expanding citizenship rights serves to promote and consolidate national integration by maximizing popular 
consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the 
expressed interests and needs of the public.  Respecting the rights of citizens has to supplement the efforts to 
accommodate diversities in ethnic, religion and culture as the center of social integration through nation building. 
The process of national construction must therefore be based on the commitment to unity in diversity. This  
implies  not only the need to integrate all the common features of all  cultures in order to forge a new historical 
identity, but also a scrupulous respect for the  language, originality and specificity of each group.  Such respect is 
essential to national unity, particularly in those countries where one or several major groups may assert their 
cultural or political dominance at the expense of minorities.
5
 Nation building implies inclusiveness, and this 
requires the practice of democracy.  Lovis supports the need of accommodating diversities that, “People should 
have loyalty to the ideas of both an overall citizenship and the narrower indigneship.” 
6
  
The working capacity of an overarching political identity of citizenship to shift the relation among 
between/among cultural or social groups from competitive to cooperative is best anchored by the nature of the 
state, for which these ethnic groups have different perception of inclusiveness or exclusiveness.  “The 
maintenance of the idea of an overall citizenship is dependent on the existence of the state perceived to be 
neural.”
7
  Substantially speaking, if the state is believed to be allied with a certain group/s; unprivileged groups 
are not likely to trust the state and consecutively have weaker loyalty to it. The perception of the state neutrality 
would empower the state to take strong and legitimate position in the process of adjudicating the potential and 
alleged conflict among ethnic groups. “It is crucial that the state should promote an overall identity that can 
include the whole within its borders in indiscriminately.”  
8
  The healthy and stability of a modern democracy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Perspective. (Cambridge &New York: Cambridge University Press), p.10.  
1 Kassahun, Birhanu “Constitutionalism and Human Security in the Horn of Africa: Examination of States of Affairs in 
Ethiopia,’” Conference Proceedings  of  on Constitutionalism and Human Security in the Horn of Africa,  Inter-Africa Group, 
October 2007, p11.  
2 Tsegaye Regassa (2008) “The Making and Legitimacy of the Ethiopian constitution: Towards Bridging the Gap Between 
constitutional Design and constitutional practice,” an article presented at a conference on  Constitutionalism And Human 
Security In The Horn Of African By Inter-Africa Group, August, 2008, P.3  
3 Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges   ‘The Challenges Of Governance in Africa,’ The 2nd  Africa Governance, Leadership and 
Management Convention , Mombasa, Kenya, August 2-5, 2011, p.8. 
4  Bendix, Reinhard (1964). Nation-Building and Citizenship. (New York: Wiley and Sons), , p. 18. 
5 Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges   ‘The Challenges Of Governance In Africa ,’  The 2nd  Africa Governance, Leadership and 
Management Convention , Mombasa, Kenya, August 2-5, 2011,p.6. 
6 Aalen Lovis(2002) ‘Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant party state: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000,’ (Bergenichr. 
Michelsea. (IDSH),  P.245. 
7 Ibid, P. 246.           
8 MC Garry, John and Brenda O’Leary (2003) “Federation, conflict regulation, and National and Ethnic power-sharing,’ 
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depends not only on the justice of its institutions but also on the qualities and attitude of its citizens.
1
 This 
normative ways or dispositions are known as social capital of citizenship. For Galstone
2
, it includes the 
following:  general virtues (courage, law abidingness and loyalty), social virtues( in dependence and open- 
mindedness), economic virtues (work ethnics, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and 
technological change), and political virtues (capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to 
demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office and willingness to 
engage in public discourse). 
 
III. Decentralization and Communal Empowerment  
The contribution of decentralized governance in conflict management is significant when the source of the 
conflict has to do with claiming self-administration. Its relevance especially for multicultural states   emanates 
from the demand of the cultural groups to exercise political power that further strengthens their identities by 
providing the necessary institutional and financial resources.  
In way that substantiate this proposition that decentralization has a positive impact in de-escalating the 
intensity of communal res conflict, Nzongola proffers the African experience. He argues,  “since the state is a 
major source of material and social resources and a principal avenue for wealth accumulation, most of the 
conflicts in Africa revolve around the control of the state and the resources at its disposal.
3
  Nevertheless, the it 
might be difficult to associate every cultural based conflict with economic demands alone.  
The benefits derived form decentralization go beyond securing resource in ensuring local 
empowerment. The creation of different centers of public participation, in one hand, allows democratic 
governance to flourish, and enables to the effective implementation of public policies. The fulfillment of varying 
local preferences and interests enhances the effectiveness of governance in a achieving locally priorities. Hence, 
decentralization supplies the system of governance to go about contentious demands through bottom-up 
articulation of needs that would otherwise forms the base for the formation of conflict from below.  
 
IV. Socio-economic developments 
The other equally important feature of good governance in order to reduce social conflict is the accessibility of 
socio-economic services and opportunities. This has a much telling conflict aggravating tendency in the 
developing states when the primary orientation of the governance system is the security of the state from within 
and without.  The recently emerging definition of security as the concern for human security yields the state 
security to be supplementary in a situation of mass impoverishment in which the living standard of citizens may 
be as fatal as military aggression.  The significance of human security even to the traditional state security 
mentioned by Mwagiru as follows: 
It [state security] ignores individual security or individual insecurity against all manner of 
threats and deprivations. While state security is important, it is also argued that state security 




Therefore, the militaristic conception of security without socio-economic progress creates is nothing more than 
tenuous peace that could be plagued by conflicts when individuals believe or know that undemocratic or poor 
governance is responsible for their unsecured livelihood. In this respect, meaningful provision of public service 
and infrastructural development are the critical issues most developing states faced with in preventing conflicts 
that frequently erupts. 
 
3. Governance and Conflict in the Horn of Africa  
The causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa are admixture of various factors than operates in a mutually 
reinforcing manner. One central characteristic of the Horn is that analysis can start with any conflict situation–
whether it be Eritrea and Ethiopia, Somalia, Darfur or Northern Uganda–and map out a trail linking to other 
countries and their internal or bilateral conflicts.
5
 The very reason for such complexity lies in the nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of American political science Associations August, 2003;, P.14.  
1 See kymlicka,Will(1995) Multicultural Citizenship.(Oxford:Clarendon Press) , P. 285 
2  Galstone(1991),p.221-‘4 cited in Kymlicka, will ‘Emerging Western Model of Multinational Federalism: Are they relevant 
for Africa? I Turton, David (ed.) (2006) Ethnic Federalism; The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. (Oxford: 
James currey Ltd),  p.10  
3  Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges   ‘The Challenges Of Governance in Africa,’ The 2nd  Africa Governance, Leadership and 
Management Convention, Mombasa, Kenya, August 2-5, 2011, p.7.  
4Mwagiru, Makumi (ed.) (2004) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization. (Nairobi:  Heinrich Böll Foundation), 
p.68.  
5 Cliffe, Lionel, Love, Roy and Tronvoll, Kjetil 'Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa', Review of African Political 
Economy, 36: 120. 
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societies found in the region across the states that share age-old circumstances from either inside or outside.  The 
long-standing trend of forming alliances and counter- alliances among the states in a number of politically 
significant issues results from their mutual sensitivity and attachment as the current situation in Somalia proves 
the fact that almost all states of the region have seemingly equal stake.   
This mutual entanglement   yields the conflicts in Somalia to be the other way around for the other 
states to tryout their foreign policies of one to the other.  Ethiopian military intervention, conventionally 
speaking, in 2006 was not motivated to tackle only the worsening security in Somalia rather by the alleged 
imminence of politically contending forces in Somalia. That is why Weber expresses this either-or political 
alignment, “Regional interests -economic, political and ideological-are played out in Somalia, relatively 
unhindered by a functional Somalia state. The civil war in Somalia thus increases the existent polarization in the 
Horn of Africa.” 
1
 The Eritrean wide covering support for the UIC
2
 (Union of Islamic Courts found in 2004) has 
compelled Ethiopia to be as close as Somalia’s warring parties have to the frontline.  The same is true in the 
relation among Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and Uganda almost for a half century.  
Uganda also supported the SPLM (Sudanese People Liberation Movement) while so does Sudan 
Uganda’s LRA and other Ugandan rebel groups. Sudan supported Eritrean separatist forces: the People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) though interrupted from 1972-1983, and TPLF 
(Tigriyan People’s Liberation Front) too. Ethiopian under Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu countered by 
aiding SPLM.  Sudan supported the Islamists in the early 1990s, Eritrea Sudan’s opposition groups, the National 
Democratic Alliance.
3
 Eritrea currently is said to support various Ethiopian insurgency groups against the 
Ethiopian regime, while the Ethiopian regime retaliates by supporting Eritrean opposition groups, including the 




Overall, the Horn of Africa is a conflict-ridden part of the African continent. The bedrocks of the 
conflicts are both of internal and external. The external factors, as discussed above, are more of presented itself 
in the form of mutual intervention and proxy conflicts.  However, the focus of this work is based on the 
conviction that the intensity and ramifications of the conflicts in the Horn is highly determined by the character 
of the regimes on power. No matter how vehement is the external factor, including from the global one, the 
mode of domestic governance precedes in shaping the trend of conflicts.  Governance as the totality of 
institutions, procedures and set of rights, obligations and authority has the central role in engendering, escalating, 
de-escalating, neutralizing, managing and resolving conflicts. As identified in the conceptual framework,   the 
system of governance that embody principles of constitutionalism, inclusive social integration and fulfilling 
socio-economic I demands of the public is by far less conflict provocative than undemocratic and economically 
unsupportive  governance. Hence, it is imperative to look into the practice of these principles in the governance 
matrix of the Horn of Africa in order to identify their implications for conflict. 
 
3.1 Constitutionalism     
For constitutionalism implies the conditions under which the power of the government is circumscribed within 
the legal order, the violation of rights is less likely to occur and if violated the mechanism of protection is readily 
available to hold the government accountable.  Besides, the practice of competitive political process is the basis 
for keep the limitation of power and discretion to intact. 
 
I. Human Rights  
In this case, human right as a wider category of substantial rights its violation is usually sensitive compared to 
other rights. They are less compromising for political objectives and ideological orientations. To  come to the 
issue at stake,  in the Horn of Africa the lack of transparency in regimes and  non-adherence to the rule of law 





,   the insufficient accountability of leaders, the military and security services, 
                                                          
1  Weber, Annette ‘State Building in Somalia: Challenges in a Zone of Crisis,’ in Eva-Maria Bruchhaus and Monika 
M.Sommer (ed.) Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approach to Make Sense of Conflict. (Berlin: Lit Verlag), 2008, p.15. 
2 The Resolution of UNSC on Eritrea mentioned in Human Rights watch (2013) World Report 2013 : Events of  2012. P.112.    
3 Cliffe, Lionel, Love, Roy and Tronvoll, Kjetil 'Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa', Review of African Political 
Economy, 36: 120. 
4  Mengisteab, Kidane ‘Critical factors in the Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts,’ Discussion Paper 67. (NorDisKa  
AFriKainsTiTuTeT, uPPsaLa), 2011, (UK: Lightening Source), p.14.  
5 Mesin,  Berouk “ The Horn of Africa security Complex,” in Sharamo, Roba and (ed.) “Regional Security in the post-Cold 
War Horn of Africa Institute for Security Studies,”  Monograph 178, April 2011, p.12.  
6 Medhane, T. ‘New Security Frontiers in the Horn of Africa,’ Friedrich-Ebert-Stitung, Dialogue on  
Globalization, 2004, p.7. Cited in Mesin Berouk “ The Horn of Africa security Complex,” in Sharamo, Roba and (ed.) 
“Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa Institute for Security Studies,”  Monograph 178, April 2011, p.12.  
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in recent times emerging from a liberation-front background; ensure the hold on power of these militarized 
regimes in the Horn of Africa. The situation in Eritrean and Eritrea as having the co-liberation fighter leaders 
supports this diachronic approach of Medhane for making sense the violation of human rights in these states.   
Serious  Human rights abuses, forced labor , indefinite military services, death, torture, detention without trial, 
restriction of the freedom of expression and worship says Human Rights Watch are rampant in Eritrea. 
1
  The 
same goes true for Ethiopia and Sudan. The Darfur conflict has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, 
suppression of protests, attacking the inhabitants bordering the South Sudan, Southern Kordofa and in Blue Nile 
violation of human rights are examples of the deteriorating situation in Sudan.
2
  The Report
3
 Concludes, “seven 
years after the ICC (International Criminal Court) issued warrant or summon to appear against six individuals, 
Sudan continued to refuse to cooperate with the ICC or to maintain prosecute the crimes in its court.” Forced 
mass displacement, torture, extra-judicial execution, abuse in detention and restricted the freedom of expression 
were the major violation of human rights in Ethiopia as reported by the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International.
4
   Vividly Amnesty International puts,  
The suppression of peaceful protest and the army, and its proxy militia, the Liyu police (special 
force), faced repeated allegations of human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, 
extrajudicial executions, and rape. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees were widely 




The problem in Somali that is abating currently is the imposition of fundamentalist Islamic modes of behavior on 
the public indiscriminately, e.g. prohibiting Bollywood movies, public screenings of the World Cup matches, 
chewing Chat and wearing dresses rather than Hijabs.
6
 In Djibouti, the emergence of new corners of oppositions 
beyond the traditional the Afar-Issa shows increasingly shows the cliff of human right which appeals to every 
individual regardless of ethnic identification. Individuals from the non-Issa clans of Somali like Issak, 
Gardabursi and Darod; Yemenites, and other have been showing their dissatisfaction with the current political 
system. This is due to its sole orientation and the limited sensitivity of the government to the relation between 
Afars and Isaas. In line with this, kadamy asserted that an intra-clan would be the problem in the future if the 
tension between afar and Issa coming flattening.
7
 Here, the collapse of Somalia and the ensued instability is one 
of the factors for the influx of individuals with different background. The perception of mutual threat, with a 
wide range of unintended political consequences. On the one hand, external threats used to draw attention from 
real internal problems; and on the other hand, a politicized, compromised and restless military with its proneness 
to usurp state power and resources represents a grave danger to inherently fragile regimes as well as their 




II. Attitude versus accountability: A unique example  
Also, given the highly personalized milieu in which politics operates in the Horn of Africa, ‘strong-man 
benevolent leader[s]’
9
. Various scientific and unscientific explanations about the causes of the war and the next 
by deadlock situation have been forwarded. For example, Bahru
10
 attributed the causes of the war to the lack of 
democratic tradition in both countries. Bereket 
11
 has also identified many intertwined factors including: the 
clash of ambitions (“colliding egos”) of the two leaderships; Ethiopian Tigrayans ambition to establishment of 
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the “Great Tigray” by observing Eritrea and obliterating its separate identity; Isaias Afeworki`s Napoleonic 
complex to dominate Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa; and power competition between the two leaders to 





, this highly personified relation between the two that is rather has fomented 
turmoil and animosity, which later calumniated with the forsaken war and ongoing tight tension between the two 
countries.  
According to Other observers like Young
3
, International Crisis Group African Report
4





  previous unholy alliance and trust less friendship of the protagonists (virtually TPLF/EPRDF 
and EPLF) during the guerrilla warfare are fuelling factors to the war and obstacles to a negotiated peace 
solution. This, finally, exhibits that the cause of the conflict is more or less related with the attitude of the 
political leadership in both countries as opposed to well-articulated claims. The fact is still one of the two parties 
does not believe the boarder is the real cause of the conflict after fighting the war that gravely costs many lives. 
If there had an internal mechanism of accountability well integrated with the decision making process of the two 
states, the conflict would not erupted “unexpectedly”. 
 
III. Multi-Party system  
The implication of party system for conflicts in the Horn Africa is very clear when competing parties participate 
in the election than boycott or repressed by the incumbent. The post-election violence such as the events of 
2007-2008 in Kenya, Ethiopia (2005) account the degrees of relevance that competitive politic has to measure 
the satisfaction of the public on how the governance is undergoing.
7
  The democratic essence of the political 
system that the Horn states has not yet tested in  such a way that the leaders should confirm their legitimacy in 
the face of myriad crisis the citizens live in, let alone the common tendency of ethnification of political 
contentions.  
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Sudan, though prematurely, are under the rule of political parties emerged 
from defeating the ancient regime. National Congress Party, People’s Front for Democratic and Justice and 
Ethiopian peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front in Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, respectively. After the 
election of May 15 2005 when EPRDF was trembled, elections have become only a symbolic vote to ‘re-confirm’ 
its power of the EPRDF what is called electoral authoritarianism
8
.  In Eritrea, The continuation of conflict with 
Ethiopia over the border demarcation justifies the prolongation of a severely authoritarian government, where 




With regard to Djibouti, the public protests the government has faced with the decision of president 
Guelleh to amend the Constitution in April 2010 for extending the presidential tenure from six years to five years 
and the term form two to three. The approval of this amendment enabled Guelleh to be elected without 
competitors for the third time in 2011 as expected from the total boycott of oppositions. This was done in the 
time of Arab Uprising that invited the people of Djibouti, regardless of ethnic background, to take to the street in 
disenchanting the government for its undemocratic nature and the rising of the living cost. This has to be seen 
from the perspective of possibly reviving ethnic based conflicts that had been thought receding, given the 
intensity of the government’s response to the protest.  It seems for this reason kadamy argues that ethnic balance 
can be restored in the contest of democracy.
 10
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3.2.  Societal Integration 
As seen in the theoretical discussion, the implication of socially integration brings with it the system if 
interaction followed in the society. It has two dimensions especially for such diversified population as the Horn 
of Africa where more than one cultural or ethnic group lives in each state. The first is the capability of the state 
to effectively administrated its territory and thereby constituting itself as one political entity. Secondly, the need 
for building closeness among social groups.  The stat of the first dimension in the horn of Africa is more or less 
similar that some tractor of territory lived by the pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, 
Djibouti and Kenya is out of the state machinery’s reach.  The worst example is Somalia that the territorial 
control collapsed simultaneously with the failure of the state.   The roles of the state in these areas of the 
periphery have to be known in order to gain their confidence and to have them collaborate with the state in the 
efforts to sustain the territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the aim of social integration requires  to build culturally 
accommodative political setting. 
Kenya about 45 ethnic groups, Ethiopia around 80, Eritrea 8, Djibouti 2 broader groups  (Afar and the 
Darood Somali clan) and 4 main clans and numerous sub-clans in Somalia
1
 . Here, to make Somalis case clear, 
Cliffe and et al  warn that misreading of Somalia as a post-conflict scenario, external  actors have invariably 
intervened via cooperation with the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) , thus identifying themselves with 
its partisan composition, and in effect inflaming the situation.
2
  This shows that even the Transitional 
Government could not be free from ethno-cultural capture what Weber repeats, “deepened by the mistrust of 
clans and sub-clans against each other, the possibility to achieve stability and security through the support of one 
clan against the others cannot turn into a national security strategy for Somalia.” 
3
  
The main point that has to be underscored here is how well the states of the Horn of Africa have 
address cultural or ethnic based claims and mobilizations. As history informs, the major war in the horn are 
identifiable with ethno-nationalism and struggles to achieve political independence as the one variety of the right 
of self-determination. The Eritrea after its federalization with Ethiopia in 1952 had wagged with Ethiopia until it 
finally seceded in 1991. The South Sudan beginning from 1956. With the exception of cessation of war, 1972-
1983, had fought to achieve its 2011 independence. The Afar movement in Djibouti, Eastern Sudan, Darfur, 
Kenya ethnic based political configurations and post-election violence, the armed and legal ethnic movements in 
Ethiopia. All these deserve political solution to strengthen national unity, common commitment and 
responsibility to set off the witnessed conflicts.   
 
3.3. Socio-economic Development 
State security as it is traditionally conceived, militaristic sovereignty has not helped many of the states in the 
Horn very much. The failure by the state security forces   in Ethiopia and Sudan to ensure the security of the 
state in the wake of peoples’ movements tells more on this issue.  People’s revolutionary movements have 
overthrown many armies of the counties of the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) region.
4
 
Thus in its broader sense, security must include in addition to state security, individual security from want, 
poverty, disease, ignorance, enjoyment of human rights and freedom. In short, security must also address social, 
economic, legal and political concerns, and the rights and living conditions of the individual.  
In Somalia, the strategies used so far are dominated by the security first approach and tend to follow a 
top down rather than a bottom-up direction.
 5
   The welfare of the Somalia population determines the success of 
the consolidation of the new governance. The state is unable to provide adequate health and education services 
or to remedy mass unemployment, which partly results from unsustainably high population growth. 
6
The 
dependency of both the Sudan and south Sudan on the oil prevents them from achieving the peace dividend. The 
contention and conflicts in the oil rich areas still become the main crack of the post-secession period for the two 
countries.  
The bottleneck for the effective provision of public amenities and infrastructure corruption. In the Horn 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1996), pp. 511-521, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.  p. 517.  
1 Mwagiru, Makumi (ed.) (2004) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization. (Nairobi:  Heinrich Böll Foundation). 
p.72.  
2 Cliffe, Lionel, Love, Roy and Tronvoll, Kjetil 'Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa', Review of African Political 
Economy, 36: 120, p.162.  
3  Weber, Annette ‘State Building in Somalia: Challenges in a Zone of Crisis,’ in Eva-Maria Bruchhaus and Monika 
M.Sommer (ed.) Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approach to Make Sense of Conflict. (Berlin: Lit Verlag), 2008, p.20 
4 Mwagiru, Makumi (ed.) (2004) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization. (Nairobi:  Heinrich Böll Foundation), 
p.69.  
5  Weber, Annette ‘State Building in Somalia: Challenges in a Zone of Crisis,’ in Eva-Maria Bruchhaus and Monika 
M.Sommer (ed.) Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approach to Make Sense of Conflict. (Berlin: Lit Verlag), 2008, p.23. 
6 Berouk, Mesin  “ The Horn of Africa security Complex,” in Sharamo, Roba and (ed.) “Regional Security in the post-Cold 
War Horn of Africa Institute for Security Studies,”  Monograph 178, April 2011, p.12-‘3. 
International Journal of African and Asian Studies                                                                                                                           www.iiste.org 




of Africa, the nature of state power is a key source of conflict political victory assumes a winner-takes-all form 
with respect to wealth and resources as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office.
1
 Furthermore, excessive 
militarization eventually entails an increased burden, especially in present times of dwindling resources and 
economic crises. As the Eritrean self-evident, though undisclosed situation shows excessive military spending is 
essentially wasteful, resulting in social projects in education or health remaining stagnant or even non-existent. 
Competitions and the attendant conflicts on f natural resource especially in the pastoral low land areas of the 
region due to environmental degradation and population pressure needs to receive attention in the provision of 
social services and infrastructure.   
 
4. Concluding Remark  
The nature of conflicts dictates the necessary set of governance principles.  The conflicts in the Horn of Africa 
have a direct linkage with the mode of governance lied in the exercise of the public authority.   The practice 
constitutionalism in curbing the violation of human rights is less entrenched that the constitutional and human 
rights of citizens in the region have gone ineffective. As indicted in a number of international reports and the 
public protest itself, the flourishing of democratic governance that advances the interest of the people even for 
the socio-economic development is highly compromised. The stifling of democratic forces and civil societies 
drag behind the democratization process in the region, which in turn, makes disagreements intense because 
democracy believed  to open up the dialogue in an acceptable procedures. Thus, democratic governance as a tool 
of conflict prevention and management is the less tried approach in the Horn of Africa compared with the well-
trodden tactics of suppressing conflicts. 
The other insight gained form the discussion is the character of states in the region deserves a system 
of inclusive and participatory nation building where the governance system is expected be the symbol of 
inclusiveness. A system of governance captured by specific agenda and cultural backgrounds is less likely to 
succeed the project of nation building in which every social group perceives its relevance for the state.  Problems 
that have to do with asserting identity in the image of the state are abundant in the Horn of Africa and some even 
went to declare their political independence.  As a remark, decentralization and diversity accommodation, either 
in the form of autonomy centered or integrative approach is also, like constitutionalism, not embraced in the 
genuine sense of the term. Exceptions in this case may be that of Ethiopian federal dispensation following the 
collapse of the military regime in 1991 and that of the new constitutions of Kenya and Southern Sudan (2011). 
The impact of governance in enhancing the living standards of citizens has a cogent linkage with 
conflict formation especially in the diverse society where individual economic circumstances would coincide 
with social identity. In this regard, the situation of the pastoralist communities in the Horn of Africa is almost 
similar.  This is further exacerbated by the environmental degradation and the attendant diminishing of the 
natural resource on which these communities depend on.  Corruption in some states like Ethiopia and Southern 
Sudan has the devastating effect in expanding the rift of inequality among citizens that is more susceptible to be 
seen through the eye of ethnicity. Hence, the improving the socio-economic situations has to be considered as a 
mechanism of getting the people to be conflict avoiding. 
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